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In the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in District of
Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 courts and scholars
remain deeply conflicted not only about the specific rules of Second
Amendment doctrine, but about what even counts as a Second Amendment
argument. An advocate might defend a particular gun control law on the
basis that it effectively prevents violent deaths, only to be told that such a
“freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” is forbidden.3 So the advocate
might switch tacks and emphasize the law’s similarity to the kinds of
historically well-established restrictions approved in Heller,4 only to learn
that it would be “weird” if a law’s constitutionality depended on its age.5
Little wonder, then, that courts and scholars have tried to import wellestablished doctrines from other areas of constitutional law. The most
attractive source for this borrowing has been First Amendment doctrine,

* Associate Professor, Duke Law School.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. See generally Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009) [hereinafter Blocher,
Categoricalism].
4. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
5. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

38

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 91:37

which for all of its complications and internal incoherence6 at least offers
reliably familiar mechanisms for protecting the exercise of a right in the
home, 7 in public places, 8 and in novel ways 9 —precisely the kinds of
questions with which Second Amendment doctrine has begun to fumble.
Greg Magarian’s Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First
Amendment Destabilizes the Second warns against this trend, arguing that
“analogies to First Amendment doctrine offer very little help in formulating
Second Amendment doctrine.”10 This is not because the two Amendments
are totally incomparable—indeed, Magarian’s argument is premised on
exploring their similarities. Where Magarian breaks from the general trend
is in his finding that the comparison yields very little useful guidance.
Specifically, he concludes that a proper reading of the Second Amendment
“compels a collectivist construction”11 that roots the individual right to keep
and bear arms 12 in an insurrectionist justification: “to deter the federal
government from becoming tyrannical and to mount an insurrection should
tyranny arise.” 13 That insurrectionist reading, Magarian argues, is flatly
incompatible with the First Amendment’s well-established role in protecting
debate as the constitutionally preferred method of political dynamism. 14
Thus, although the First Amendment is not a useful template for the Second,
it does cast a large and heavy shadow, giving the Second Amendment “little
room to develop as a meaningful source of legal authority.”15

6. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1270
(1995) (“[T]he Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence . . . dances now macabrely on the edge of
complete doctrinal disintegration.”).
7. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (protecting, on First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, private possession of obscene materials). For an extended argument
extending Stanley’s rationale to the Second Amendment, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut:
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (allowing content-neutral
“time, place, and manner” restrictions on speech so long as they serve an important government
objective, are narrowly tailored, and preserve ample alternative means of communication).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (finding video
games to be covered by the First Amendment).
10. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes
the Second, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 49, 99 (2012).
11. Id. at 52.
12. Magarian does not contest the use of the “individual right” label, id. at 52, but then again
neither did Justice Stevens in his Heller dissent. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a
‘collective right’ or an ‘individual right.’ Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by
individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell
us anything about the scope of that right.”).
13. Magarian, supra note 10, at 52–53. Presumably the same reasoning would have to apply to
tyrannies of state and even local governments after McDonald.
14. Id. at 87–98 (describing the “constitutional triumph of First Amendment dynamism over
Second Amendment insurrectionism”).
15. Id. at 53.
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This review will focus on two of the many issues raised by Magarian’s
complex article.
Part I discusses intra-constitutional comparativism,
arguing—in agreement with Magarian—that doctrinal analogies are useful
only to the degree that they are premised on relevant similarities. Many
Second Amendment arguments—not only those Magarian criticizes, but
others “internal” to the Amendment—fail this basic test. Part II focuses on
the relationship between auxiliary and direct rights to insurrection, arguing
that Magarian’s criticism is particularly strong as to the latter, but that the
Second Amendment might nonetheless protect the former. To the degree
that it does, the conflict with the First Amendment is not quite so sharp. The
review concludes by suggesting that the Second Amendment, like the First,
might be animated by many different values, and that this complicates both
Magarian’s criticism and the future of Second Amendment doctrine.
I.

Amendments and Analogies

Because I am among the intra-constitutional comparativists Magarian
criticizes, 16 I should perhaps begin by explaining why the comparison
between the First and Second Amendments has proven so attractive to those
of us who have employed it. The primary reason is the howling vacuum of
guidance in Heller itself.17
It would, of course, be too much to expect that Heller would provide a
roadmap for all future Second Amendment litigation. But the opinion is
deficient even within its own four corners. It is, for example, extremely
difficult (if not impossible) to follow the methodological road Heller
describes—a kind of categorical historicism, rather than application of
traditional tiers of scrutiny—and reach the destinations it does: approving
bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill 18 or of “dangerous and
unusual” weapons. 19 I have argued elsewhere that some elements of the
opinion’s categorical approach border on the incoherent.20

16. See id. at 68–69 (describing and criticizing Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear
Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Blocher, Right Not to Keep]).
17 . See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1371 (2009); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 280
(2009).
18. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 731 (2012) (“Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller
characterized disarming felons as a long-standing tradition, federal law did not disqualify any felons
from possessing firearms until 1938 and did not disqualify nonviolent felons until 1961.”).
19. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1480–83 (2009)
(describing the difficulty of applying the test).
20. Blocher, Categoricalism, supra note 3, at 423–29.
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Faced with a tabula rasa and charged with filling it, courts and scholars
have reached for the First Amendment.21 This is understandable. Though it
is too awkward and complicated to inspire a passionate embrace, free-speech
doctrine is nonetheless a friend with substantial benefits, familiarity primary
among them. Like the Second, the First Amendment protects the individual
exercise of a right that can have enormous social costs and arguably serves a
variety of values, including individual autonomy and protection of
democracy.
This does not mean, of course, that these similarities or the
Amendments’ proximity in the Bill of Rights are sufficient to justify
unchecked importation of speech-governing rules into the realm of firearms.
Magarian is absolutely right to criticize some of these efforts, particularly the
truly deficient argument that gun licensing is an unconstitutional “prior
restraint.” Magarian cites and criticizes an article and a student note
pursuing this line of reasoning,22 which has also been deployed by prominent
gun-rights advocates who should know much better. 23 Prior restraint
doctrine is and has always been a unique feature of free speech doctrine—
indeed, it has often been called the only intended feature of the free speech
clause.24 And as Magarian points out:
Nothing in the Second Amendment’s history suggests any similar
grounding; indeed, gun licensing figured prominently in English and
American law before and after the Amendment’s adoption. More
important, the prior-restraint principle in First Amendment doctrine
reflects a judgment not only that speech deserves strong protection but
also that government can adequately remedy legally cognizable harms
from speech after the fact.25
The First Amendment has constitutionalized the idea that, although
there may be “danger flowing from speech,” in most circumstances “the
remedy to be applied is more speech,”26 rather than ex ante restrictions. The
Second Amendment does not similarly provide that the sole remedy to be

21. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that
several circuits have begun to “adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment context”
and pointing to multiple scholarly articles that support this approach); United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting automatic application of strict scrutiny to firearms
restrictions in accordance with the varying levels of scrutiny applied to particular First Amendment
claims).
22. See Magarian, supra note 10, at 69 & n.97.
23. See, e.g., Brief of Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants Seeking Reversal at 18, Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. May 31,
2011) (arguing that “there is no better, indeed, there may be no other, logical interpretive tool” for
evaluating gun permit requirements).
24. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,
651–52 (1955).
25. Magarian, supra note 10, at 70 (internal citations omitted).
26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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applied to gun violence is more guns. Fortunately, judges have recognized
as much and have consistently declined to import prior restraint rules.27
Magarian can convincingly debunk such poor analogies without delving
deeply into a theory of analogical reasoning itself—the arguments he
criticizes are so unbalanced that a slight push is sufficient to upend them.
But others of his targets are on better footing, and taking them down requires
a correspondingly stronger foundation. Because Magarian criticizes the
analogy itself, and not simply the doctrinal results thereof, he must do so on
the basis of what makes an analogy appropriate, not just what First or Second
Amendment doctrine require. Fully attacking an analogy requires a theory
of analogy.
This is of course an unfair thing for a reviewer to ask. It would be
impossible for Magarian or any other scholar to fully provide such a theory
in the course of making an argument from it. The nature of analogical
reasoning is in some sense the very heart of legal reasoning, and has
deservedly commanded substantial attention from generations of legal
theorists.28 But even a brief and superficial skim of that literature can help
provide a fulcrum for Magarian’s criticism.
One basic and relatively uncontroversial point is that analogical
reasoning is a process of picking out relevant similarities.29 For example,
one could compare the First and Third Amendments on the basis that both
involve odd numbers, or compare—as Heller did—references to “the
People” throughout the Constitution.30 Both of these are forms of analogical
reasoning based on shared characteristics, but only the latter is even arguably
defensible.31 The reason for that must have something to do with the fact
that we attribute significance to similarities in words, particularly within the

27. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 2012 WL 5907502, at *9–10 (2d Cir.
November 27, 2012); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2012); Woollard v.
Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 471–73 (D. Md. 2012).
28. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 85–102 (2009); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 934–36 (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 (1993).
29. See SCHAUER, supra note 28, at 85–102 (discussing analogical reasoning and arguing that it
must be rooted in relevant similarities); Sunstein, supra note 28, at 744 (“For analogical reasoning
to work well, we have to say that the relevant, known similarities give us good reason to believe that
there are further similarities and thus help to answer an open question.”); see also Brewer, supra
note 28, at 933 (claiming that most accounts of analogy hold that “analogical argument moves not
by similarity alone, but by ‘relevant’ similarity”).
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (“[I]n all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the
people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an
unspecified subset.”).
31. By contrast, if one were attempting to show which constitutional provisions have been
linked to the concept of privacy, then the former analogy makes more sense. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (linking the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments to privacy).
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confines of the Constitution itself,32 but not to the odd- or even-numbering
of constitutional amendments. Whether there is some deeper reason for this
is hard to say, and scholars have long struggled to provide a theory of
relevance to drive analogical reasoning.33 As no less authority than H.L.A.
Hart put it, “until it is established what resemblance and differences are
relevant, ‘Treat like cases alike’ must remain an empty form. To fill it we
must know when, for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike
and what differences are relevant.”34
This might sound like analytic philosophy, but its application to Second
Amendment doctrine is easy enough to see. Magarian’s argument against
the First-Second Amendment analogy, after all, is premised on his
conclusion that the similarities between the Amendments are simply not as
relevant as their differences. The question, of course, is what kinds of
similarities matter. Magarian’s mostly-implicit conclusion is that the
Amendments should be interpreted in light of the values they are designed to
protect, and that the “insurrectionist” purpose of the Second Amendment is
incompatible with the First Amendment’s already-instantiated protection of
speech as the mechanism of political change and the prevention of tyranny.
The second Part of this Response will address that argument in more
detail, but it is worth noting that the problem with analogical reasoning in the
context of the Second Amendment runs even deeper. Two examples should
suffice to illustrate the point. In Heller and McDonald, the Court approved
as constitutional various contemporary gun control laws that are
“longstanding” or rooted in traditional restrictions:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.35
To provide guidance for future courts in cases involving other laws not
specifically blessed in Heller, there must be some way to draw analogies
from those categories to others. What about gun owners convicted of
violent misdemeanors?
Nonviolent felons?
Undocumented aliens?
Drawing purpose-based lines from the Court’s approved categories to others
is exceedingly difficult. If the “core” of the Second Amendment is self32. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999) (“[S]trongly
parallel language is a strong (presumptive) argument for parallel interpretation.”). But see Adrian
Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113
HARV. L. REV. 730, 731 (2000) (noting that the many provisions of the Constitution were adopted
in different times and circumstances and with different rationales).
33. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 773–74 (noting that analogical reasoning does not provide its
own, necessary “theory of relevant similarities and differences”).
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).
35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n. 26.
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defense,36 then why should it not extend to felons and the mentally ill, both
of whom have self-defense rights? If instead the core of the Amendment is
the protection of insurrection or deterrence of tyranny, 37 then why should
“dangerous and unusual” weapons or “government buildings” be exempted?
If one cannot connect the dots even within the opinion itself, then it is hard to
imagine how they can be extended to cover future cases.
Similar questions of analogical reasoning arise when it comes to
defining the “Arms” covered by the Second Amendment. In the case that
became Heller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded
that constitutional coverage should extend to “lineal descendant[s] of . . .
founding-era weapon[s]” that are “in ‘common use’ today.”38 Though the
Supreme Court did not specifically adopt this test, echoes of it appeared both
at oral argument39 and in the Heller opinion.40 But what makes a modern
gun a “descendant” of another? Barrel length? Caliber? Muzzle velocity?
Capacity for repeating fire? One way to answer the question would be to
say that the characteristics that matter are those relevant to the values or
purpose of the Amendment itself.41 This would suggest that the modern-day
Buntline (the weapon Dick Heller sought to register) is a lineal descendant of
colonial-era pistols because “the American people have considered the
handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”42 What makes the
guns relevantly similar, then, is their popularity for effectuating the right of
self-defense, which Heller identified as the “core” of the Second
Amendment.43 But the purpose-based approach runs into problems as well,
for the Court specifically excludes military weapons from scope of the
Amendment,44 even while concluding that protecting the militia was a reason
for the Amendment’s inclusion in the Constitution. 45 How can that be
squared with the argument that self-defense interests guide the definition of
“Arms”?
Of course, the fact that Second Amendment doctrine suffers from many
potential defects of analogical reasoning is not a point against Magarian’s
argument that the First Amendment analogy in particular is problematic.

36. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630.
37. See supra note 13.
38. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
39. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (Justice Scalia
suggesting that “Arm” in the Second Amendment is used in a “specialized sense” to denote a
weapon “that was used in militias and . . . nowadays commonly held”).
40 . Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (treating a weapon’s “unusual” nature as a ground for its
prohibition).
41. Blocher, Categoricalism, supra note 3, at 417 (“The question in Heller, then, was not
whether modern handguns are connected to Founding-era weapons by some technological link but
rather whether they are connected by some meaningful constitutional principle.”).
42. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
43. Id. at 630.
44. Id. at 627–28.
45. Id. at 599.
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The point of this discussion is simply to suggest that Magarian has identified
a problem that is even broader than the specific examples he discusses.
II.

Insurrection and the Constitution

These questions go to the very heart of legal reasoning; analogizing and
distinguishing legal authorities (including historical ones) is in some sense
simply what lawyers do. Magarian’s approach to this analogical question is,
as noted above, to say that the Second Amendment’s first clause—“A wellregulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State”—requires
that the second clause—“the right of the People to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed”—be read through a “collectivist” lens. 46 The leading
collectivist theory, in turn, is that the Second Amendment protects an
“insurrectionist” right, one rooted in the notion that an armed populace will
be able to either deter or fight off a tyrannical government. 47 And that
insurrectionist–collectivist reading is simply not open, Magarian argues,
because the First Amendment’s protection of political change through
peaceful debate has occupied the field.48
I share Magarian’s frustration with the Court’s inability to make sense
of the Second Amendment’s first clause. In Heller, the majority concluded
that the militia-related language in that clause “can only show that selfdefense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central
component of the right itself.”49 This is problematic reasoning, to say the
least.50 But whatever its faults on this point, Heller does clearly state that
the “central component” and “core” of the Second Amendment right is
individual self-defense,51 which is why many of us have tried to interpret it
in light of that announced purpose.52
For the purposes of this review, however, I will instead take as given
Magarian’s conclusion that the Second Amendment should be read with an
insurrectionary purpose in mind. And that raises a first-order question that
is implicit throughout Magarian’s analysis: How can there be a constitutional
right to insurrection? Of course, nearly all constitutional rights are designed
to limit or check government power,53 but that is different from having a
right to insurrection itself. The former is auxiliary, the latter direct, and

46. Magarian, supra note 10, at 52.
47. Id. at 52–53.
48. Id. at 87–98.
49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
50. For a criticism of the reasoning, see Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1350–52 (2009). To be clear, Lund himself
believes that there are good answers to these questions, but that Heller simply fails to provide them.
Id. at 1351–52.
51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630.
52. See, e.g., Blocher, Right Not to Keep, supra note 16, at 13–18 (examining the Second
Amendment’s terms “carry” and “bear” through the lens of self-defense).
53. There are some arguable exceptions, such as the Thirteenth Amendment.
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those characteristics—and therefore the impact of Magarian’s critique—are
significant different.
As a constitutional matter, Second Amendment insurrectionism is at its
weakest, and Magarian’s critique at its strongest, with regard to the notion of
a direct right to insurrection. Even holding aside the First Amendment
analogy, it is simply difficult to imagine how such a constitutional right
would function. Would an arms-bearing insurrectionist, prosecuted for
violating a gun control law, come to a court and ask a judge (a representative
of the tyrannical government) for the tyrannical government to sanction an
insurrectionist attack on itself? American history has resolved—at great
cost—the question of whether armed secession is a constitutional option, and
“no serious scholar or politician now argues that a right to secede exists
under American constitutional law.” 54 If the right to armed insurrection
cannot be validly exercised by millions of people in concert, how could it be
validly invoked by individuals?55
But the fact that the Constitution does not (and perhaps cannot) protect a
right to insurrection proper does not mean that the Second Amendment—or
other constitutional provisions and amendments, including the First—have
nothing at all to say about the subject. The Constitution can sow the seeds
of its own destruction without having the capacity to reap them. It seems
possible, in other words, that the Second Amendment protects an “auxiliary”
right56—one that enables insurrection without blessing it. This is the version
of the insurrection right that allows people to prepare for a tyrannical
“doomsday,”57 and perhaps even prevent that doomsday from coming, but
does not protect the actual act of violent insurrection. Many constitutional
provisions, including but not limited to speech, arguably function in this way.
These auxiliary rights have surprisingly nuanced relationships with the
underlying interests they are designed to protect. Consider the self-defense
reading of the Second Amendment, which treats self-defense as the core and
central component of the right.58 This seems simple enough, but is in some
senses exactly backwards: The right to defend oneself against immediate
threats of harm precedes Heller and indeed the Second Amendment itself.
Like the possible insurrectionist right discussed above, it arguably exists
outside of the Constitution, and the closer one gets to that core the less one

54. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 633 (1991).
55. For further analysis, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment,
86 IND. L.J. 939 (2011).
56. See Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 116 (2002).
57. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), quoted in
Magarian, supra note 10, at 90–91.
58. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630.
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needs to invoke the Amendment.59 What the Second protects is a particular
means: the right to have particular weapons on hand should the need ever
arise to use them for self-defense.60
These issues regarding the relationship between insurrection and
constitutionalism complicate Magarian’s critique. As to the former, it seems
reasonable enough to argue, as Magarian does, that our constitutional system
emphasizes political dynamism through peaceful speech, rather than through
violence. But treating speech as the primary means of directly opposing
actual or potential tyranny does not mean that arms-bearing cannot serve as
an auxiliary check, alongside other rights like association, assembly, and
even jury trials. Magarian surmises that “even if actual insurrection never
breaks out, gun proliferation will present a far greater danger of distorting
and discouraging political debate.” 61 But the world it depicts—one of
largely unchecked gun proliferation—is generally the one we already live in,
and it seems to work reasonably well. Outside of some urban areas, few
Americans face stringent gun control laws, which is one reason why Heller
and McDonald have not done much to change the legal landscape. Unless
the political will emerges to pass stricter gun laws,62 it seems unlikely that a
revitalized Second Amendment—whether grounded in insurrection or some
other value—will have much of a target.
What this suggests is that the Second Amendment can continue to play a
role as an auxiliary anti-tyranny right, even if the First Amendment has pride
of place with regard to direct insurrection. The more fundamental question,
which Magarian certainly does not have to address for his argument to
succeed, is how close the Constitution can come to directly protecting its
own destruction. As Magarian’s argument suggests, that is a question with
important practical doctrinal implications.
III. The Second-Best Second Amendment
Magarian’s rich article raises far more difficult and important questions
than this short review can ask, let alone answer. I will close with one more.
In First Amendment circles, there seems to be increasing agreement that
there is simply no way to understand free speech doctrine through the lens of
a single animating value. As Frederick Schauer argues in The Second-Best

59. United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding, prior to Heller, that a
convicted felon facing threat of violence was entitled to present a justification defense to a felon-inpossession charge).
60. Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law,
Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1205, 1207 (2009) (“The majority opinion describes the right to keep and bear arms as essentially
the right to have a firearm available for immediate self-defense purposes.”).
61. Magarian, supra note 10, at 96.
62. See generally KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL
IN AMERICA (2006) (describing factors that have inhibited the enactment of stronger gun control
measures).
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First Amendment, “the very idea of free speech is a crude implement, to the
core, protecting acts that its background justifications would not protect, and
failing to protect acts that its background justifications would protect.” 63
Those background justifications are themselves diverse, as Robert Post notes:
“There is in fact no general free speech principle.”64
It seems entirely likely, if not inevitable, that the modern Second
Amendment is and will continue to be animated by a similar plurality of
values. Among these will be the insurrectionary value Magarian criticizes,
and perhaps also some echoes of the “well-regulated militia” who stubbornly
persist in the Amendment’s first clause.65 Courts will also surely emphasize
the self-defense interest that Heller itself identifies as the Amendment’s
“core” and “central component.”66
This value plurality significantly complicates matters, even if one can
establish a lexical priority of those values. 67 It would, for example, take
some force away from Magarian’s argument against the insurrectionist view.
For even if the Second Amendment has little room “to develop as a
meaningful source of legal authority”68 against laws regulating insurrection,
it might still be an important limitation for constitutional constraints of selfdefense.
On another level, a value-pluralistic Second Amendment would make it
even harder to employ (or, for that matter, to criticize) analogies between the
First and Second Amendments. The more that the Second Amendment acts
as a rough proxy for many different underlying values—self-defense and
insurrection among them—the harder it will be to criticize arguments that
draw on those values. Second Amendment doctrine will, like, First
Amendment doctrine, become murky and chaotic. But the inevitability of
that doctrinal night is no reason for courts and scholars to go gently.
Magarian, to his credit, rages against it.

63. Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best Second Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13
(1989).
64 . Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255
(1995).
65 . See generally Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of
Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB.
LAW. 1 (2009).
66. 554 U.S. at 599, 630.
67. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2371 (2000) (arguing for a lexical priority of First Amendment values).
68. Magarian, supra note 10, at 53.

